FEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES:
SERVING THE SYSTEM
OR THE CLIENT?
JOHN J. CLEARY*

I
INTRODUCTION

Thirty years ago, Congress enacted the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, thus
ensuring that those charged with federal crimes who are financially unable to
employ counsel1 would receive effective assistance of counsel.2 During the first
year of operation under that Act, the federal courts made 16,000 compensated
appointments
of counsel.3 Today that number has risen to approximately
4
89,000.

The
defense
today.'
defense

annual appropriation for compensation of attorneys and necessary
expenses has grown from $1 million in 1965 to more than $300 million
With this explosion of financial support has come judicial control over
counsel. This judicial domination denies defender services their
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1. Three out of every four defendants charged with a serious crime are unable to afford counsel.
Statistics are not maintained on the percentage of federal defendants represented by appointed counsel.
The 75% estimate is based upon observations of federal appointments and data on the percentage of
defendants with appointed counsel in state cases, where the standard of indigence may be more
stringent than the federal test of "financially unable to obtain adequate representation." 18 U.S.C. §
3006A(a). A recent study of state cases in three major cities (Detroit, Seattle, and Denver) found an
average 84% of all felony defendants had appointed counsel. NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
INDIGENT DEFENDERS: GET THE JOB DONE AND DONE WELL 13 (1992). This important statistic
should be compiled for federal courts.
2. Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-455, § 2, 78 Stat. 552 (1964) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988)).
3. COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT, REPORT OF THE COMMIITEE TO
REVIEW THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT, reprintedin 52 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2265, 2269 (Mar. 10, 1993)
[hereinafter COMMITEE REPORT].
4. Id. at 2279. One measure of the growth of federal criminal litigation is the number of major
criminal offenses. In fiscal year 1964, there were more than 29,000 filings (charges, which may have
more than one defendant), of which almost 5,000 involved auto theft in interstate commerce.
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS., 1964 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS 254. In 1993, there were approximately 65,000 major
criminal defendants, of which only 547 involved auto theft. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, in 1993

UNITED STATES COURTS: SELECTED REPORTS 124,320. Appointments of counsel exceed these figures
because counsel is also appointed in misdemeanor cases, and appointments are made at different stages
of a criminal proceeding: e.g., revocation of probation or supervised release, appeal, post-conviction
petition, and others.
5. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2269.
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independence and thereby fulfills a 1963 prophecy that such defender services
would become so institutionalized that they would serve the system rather than
the client.
The manner in which defender services are rendered in federal criminal trials
has assumed ever-increasing importance. In the past, federal courts with limited
jurisdiction had few criminal cases; the states have long been primarily
responsible for the enforcement of criminal laws. Since the 1930s, however,
federal criminal jurisdiction has expanded. For example, since 1971, the federal
courts have had jurisdiction over any drug offense, even simple possession.7 In
response to the intense public concern with crime fanned by unprincipled
politicians, federal criminal jurisdiction has continually grown to include crimes
originally handled by the states. This has led to concurrent jurisdictions with
combined and overlapping enforcement agencies. On September 13, 1994,
President Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994,8 which is more political posturing on crime, emphasizing punishment
without addressing the causes and conditions of crime. The political manipulation of crime issues prevents objective assessment of crime control measures and
protection of the rights of an accused. Part II of this article provides an
overview of the development of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
including the creation of federal defender offices. Part III argues for independence at the national level-in structure and funding-for the federal public
defender service organizations, and Part IV argues for additional independence
at the local level. Part V briefly sets out other necessary reforms in the federal
defender program, including term limits and training for federal defenders,
continuity of representation on appeal, and affording the clients a limited right
to select counsel.
II
HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
AND FEDERAL DEFENDER OFFICES

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the trial of a criminal case,
adopted in 1791, actually broke with English precedent that disfavored the
intervention of counsel as a disruptive force in the criminal process. 9 The new
sixth amendment protection recognized that counsel is essential for the accused
engaged in vital combat against the powerful and skilled legal representatives
and almost limitless resources of the state. In the early years of the protection,

6. See discussion infra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
7. Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. 11, 85 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (1988 & Supp. V 1994)).
8. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
9. It was an ancient principle of English common law that no person accused of treason or a
felony against the Crown was permitted counsel. An accused was first allowed counsel in cases of
treason in 1696 and in cases of felony in 1837. THEODORE F. T. PLuCKNErT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF
THE COMMON LAW 434-35 (5th ed. 1956).
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the right to counsel was more a myth than a reality for those without funds. In
1932, however, the United States Supreme Court held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a defendant in a capital murder
case to have a qualified lawyer capable of early investigation, adequate
preparation, and continuous consultation. ° Six years later, the right to
effective assistance of counsel was formally extended to federal felony cases."
However, not until twenty-five years later-in 1963-did the right become
applicable to12the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Prior to 1965, in federal criminal cases, the right to counsel for those
financially unable to retain counsel was the general responsibility of the bar, and
the courts would often appoint unwilling or inexperienced lawyers without
compensation for services or necessary expenses. While allocating no funds for
defense, the annual federal budget for federal criminal investigative agencies
exceeded the total cost of operation of the federal judiciary. To rectify the
imbalance, Congress enacted the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 (the "CJA"),1 3
which for the first time provided minimal compensation for appointed lawyers
and reimbursement for the expenses of experts and others.
For many years prior to the adoption of the CJA U.S. Attorneys General
had repeatedly recommended some system of compensated defense service.
These recommendations culminated in Attorney General Robert Kennedy
ordering the first comprehensive review of federal defender services, the 1963
Allen Report. 4 The Allen Report recommended payment for appointed
counsel and the creation of public defender offices, but only the former
recommendation was initially adopted by Congress. The Allen Report also
repeated the reservations about creating a federal public defender under the
influence and control of the judiciary, and it attempted to attenuate this control
by placing the power of appointment in the judicial council of the circuit.5
Concerns had been expressed that full-time defender offices would become
institutionalized, and the interests of the defender staff attorney would become
aligned and identified more with the bureaucracy than with the impoverished
and unpopular client.
In 1964, the Ford Foundation awarded a $6.1 million grant to the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association for the founding of the National Defender
Project to create and support organized defender offices. The National

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Criminal Justice Act § 2, 78 Stat. at 552.
Professor Francis A. Allen, chairman, filed the REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
COMMISSION ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE [hereinafter
ALLEN REPORT] on February 25, 1963, a few weeks before the decision in Gideon (decided on March
18). In 1971, when Congress created full-time federal defender offices, it followed the format set forth
in the Allen Report.
15. Id. at 41.
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Defender Project, under the leadership of General Charles L. Decker,
subsidized prototype federal defender offices in Chicago, San Francisco, San
Diego, and Phoenix. These were either branches of a legal aid society (San
Francisco and Phoenix) or separate nonprofit corporations (Chicago and San
Diego). Each federal office had a small full-time staff to represent clients, but
the nucleus staff also assisted panel attorneys and employed law students. In
1970, when Congress considered amendments to the CJA, these prototype
federal defender offices served as the models for the full-time federal defender
offices.
Effective in 1971, Congress for the first time authorized two alternative types
of full-time defender offices, the federal public defender organization (the
"FPDO") and the community defender organization (the "CDO"). 6 To create

a defender organization, a district must have at least 200 CJA appointments per
year. 17 To preserve local preference, the qualified district court determines
which organization would better suit local needs. Approval of the plan,
however, rests with the judicial council of the federal circuit, a governing council
consisting of district and appellate judges. To provide oversight at a national
level, Congress placed the administration and financing of federal defender
services under the Judicial Conference of the United States and the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts in Washington.'
The Judicial Conference
establishes policy through its Committee on Defender Services. It administers
programs through the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. The Administrative Office operates through its Defender Services Division, which processes
the budgets for both FPDOs and CDOs, but the courts approve the individual
vouchers of appointed attorneys and experts.
Today, a total of seventy-one of the ninety-four federal districts have a fulltime federal defender organization. There are forty-eight FPDOs operating in
fifty-eight districts and eleven CDOs in thirteen districts. In addition, there are
twenty specialized CDOs, entitled Death Penalty Resource Centers, which
represent petitioners in federal capital habeas corpus proceedings. At the trial
and appellate level, if an eligible defendant is not represented by a defender
organization, the court appoints individual counsel from local panels. Thus, in
addition to serving defendants in the twenty-three districts that have no federal
defender organization, panel attorneys represent eligible defendants that the
FPDO or the CDO cannot represent due to workload or conflicts. Today, the

16. Act of Oct. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-447, 84 Stat. 916.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(1). Both the Committee Report and the Report of the JudicialConference
recommended abolishing the 200-case requirement and creating a defender office wherever
economically feasible. COMMrrTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2294; JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE FEDERAL DEFENDER

PROGRAM 21 (1993) [hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT]. The COMMITTEE REPORT also recommended

creating a full- or part-time resource or support person for appointed counsel in those districts without
a defender office. COMMITEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2303.
18. The Judicial Conference of the United States oversees the delivery of federal defender services
and establishes national guidelines under its rulemaking power. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(h).
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representation of approximately 89,000 eligible clients is split almost equally
between the full-time staff of defender organizations and individually appointed
counsel. 19
III
INDEPENDENCE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

In January 1993, the Report of the Committee to Review the Criminal
Justice Act,' ° commonly referred to as the Prado Committee Report after its
chairman-Judge Edward C. Prado of the U. S. District Court for the Western
District of Texas,21 recommended a substantial restructuring of federal
defender services to ensure their independence by placing the national
administration of defense services in a separate Center for Federal Criminal
Defense Services ("Federal Center"). The work now done by the Judicial
Conference of the United States and the Administrative Office of the U. S.
Courts would then be done by a separate entity, but still within the judicial
branch.22
The Prado Committee had relied on the historical need to separate the
functions in the adversary system and the American Bar Association standards
that expressly prohibit judicial control over defender services. The judge, who
can directly or indirectly appoint the defender or control the compensation of
the panel attorney or expert, controls the defense of the case. This proposed
shift away from the pervasive control now exercised by the judiciary over all
aspects of the delivery of defender services met with resistance, not only from
the judiciary, but from a majority of federal public defenders, who had been
appointed by judges. Those who prefer the status quo find no faults worth such
major restructuring and believe that the system for defense of the often
unpopular indigent can be better funded as an integral part of the judiciary
rather than as a separate entity.

19. Of the approximately 89,000 persons represented under the CIA during fiscal year 1993, the
Prado Committee estimated that approximately 47,000 (53%) would be represented by the defender
organizations and 42,000 (47%) by appointed counsel. COMMITEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2279.
20. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. III, § 318, 104 Stat. 5089,5116,
directed the Judicial Conference to conduct a study on the effectiveness of federal defender services.
This congressional action was a response to the report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, which
recommended a comprehensive review of the CJA and compensation for appointed counsel: "Congress
should amend 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(2)(A) to require that the selection of the federal defender in each
jurisdiction be done by an independent board or commission formed within the district to be served."
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMTEE 157
(1990).
21. The committee's membership included two federal judges, two federal defenders (one federal
public defender and one executive director of a community defender organization), general counsel of
a state public defender office, two private practitioners, and two law professors (one a former judge).
COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2268-69.
22. Id. at 2299. Four members of the committee, three defenders and a criminal defense attorney,
filed a separate report, protesting the placement in the judiciary, because independence would not be
achieved if judges had "control over the appointment of the administrators of the defense delivery
system." Id at 2307-08.
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In March 1993, this controversial centerpiece proposal of the Prado
Committee was rejected by the Judicial Conference, which recommended that
supervision and direction of federal defender services remain with the Judicial
Conference and the Administrative Office.'
The Judicial Conference
substituted its own report for that of the Prado Committee and submitted that
to Congress. The Judicial Conference also rejected the recommendation of a
separate budget for federal defender services.24 However, the Judicial
Conference's report to Congress makes many positive recommendations for
reform, from better panel attorney compensation to the development of
attorney performance standards. These are needed changes, but the underlying
theme of the report is defender "business as usual" under the control of the
judiciary.
Not all the judges agreed with the conclusion of the Judicial Conference.'
Circuit Judge Stephanie K. Seymour, a former Chair of the Committee on
Defender Services, urged a change in the administrative structure:
Although it may have been wise to place the defender services program under the
guidance of the judiciary in the program's infancy, logically the defense component of
our criminal justice system should be as independent of the decision maker as is the
prosecution. It is uncomfortable and a bit unseemly for the very judges before whom
the criminal defense lawyer must try his or her cases to participate in the selection of
that lawyer or to decide his or her compensation.'

Under the rejected Prado Committee proposal, the Chief Justice would have
appointed the governing board of the new Federal Center. This board would
consist of seven members with experience in federal criminal defense, but
neither prosecutors nor, ultimately, judges.27 The four dissenters on the Prado
Committee would have had the Chief Justice make the appointments from a list
composed of recommendations from a variety of bar and other organizations
with experience in federal criminal defense.'
Neither the Prado Committee majority nor the dissenters went far enough,
because they left the Federal Center within the judiciary. The federal defenders
must be recognized as an independent structure if they are to have true parity,

23. The Judicial Conference found that the Prado Committee's recommendation for an independent
national center was based on a "perceived" need supported only by "anecdotal statements of a lack of
independence and the potential of occasional abuse." CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 17, at 16. As
further support for rejecting the proposal, the Judicial Conference also found that the defenders
themselves were opposed to creating a new national apparatus, such an apparatus would be more costly
in time of financial restraint, and defender programs would lose judicial support. I& at 17.
24. Itt. at 13.
25. It is ironic that the judiciary, which obtained its administrative independence from the
Department of Justice more than 50 years ago through the creation of its own separate national
administration, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, would begrudge the defenders their
independence. Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 501, § 1, 53 Stat. 1223 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 601-612 (1988 & Supp. V 1994)) (creating the Administrative Office).
26. CoMMrrrE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2287.
27. I& at 2299. The proposal allowed for as many as two of the initial members to be federal
judges. Any judge who was an initial member could be reappointed to a second three-year term. With
that exception, no active or senior federal judge would be eligible.
28. I& at 2308.
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both with their adversary, the federal prosecutors, and with the courts before
which they practice.
Congress has already provided an independent mechanism for the delivery
of civil legal assistance for those unable to afford it through the creation in 1974
of the Legal Services Corporation (the "LSC").29 The proposed independent
Federal Center should be created as the Defender Services Corporation to
finance, support, and establish policy regarding these legal services in criminal
cases. It should not be a part of the judiciary and ought to receive the same
neutral treatment as do civil legal services, which, unlike legal representation in
criminal cases, are not mandated by the Sixth Amendment. As suggested by the
Prado Committee dissenters, the members of the Federal Center might be
appointed by the Chief Justice, but from lists furnished by designated legal
service organizations. The Defender Services Corporation would perform the
role now performed by the Judicial Conference and the Administrative Office
and no more. Neither the Federal Center nor its officers should develop into
a "Defender Czar." Instead, the Federal Center should have national independent standing to balance the political power of the Department of Justice in the
administration of the federal criminal laws.
Those who criticize the LSC are not familiar with its history. After 1964,
this financing of civil legal services was operated as a part of the Office of
Economic Opportunity. However, the grantees of legal services needed
financial independence from the administration, whose acts they were regularly
challenging in court. Finally, shortly before his resignation in 1974, President
Nixon signed this legislation, which may have been an unsuccessful attempt to
appease Congress with legislation he would not have otherwise supported.
Although the Reagan Administration sought to abolish the LSC by withholding
funding, its attack initiated a response by Congress to continue and expand
funding for these legal services, even though they were not constitutionally
mandated. Now the House of Representatives, in its zeal to curtail unnecessary
spending, has again targeted civil legal services for the poor.3" This easy
budget-cutting target has survived so far only because the legal community has
strongly supported the poor's access to the civil courts.
The LSC has provided national funding of civil legal services for twenty
years and has not impaired the necessary autonomy of the local legal services
programs. The LSC does not appoint the local directors of the programs.
However, it does ensure that federal funds are properly and efficiently spent,
29. Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, § 2, 88 Stat. 378 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 2996a-29961 (1988 & Supp. V 1994)). Congress created this D.C. private,
nonmembership, nonprofit corporation with a board of directors of 11 voting members appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. No more than six voting members could be
of the same political party, and the board included representatives of the general bar, legal services
attorneys, and the general public. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996b(a), 2996c (1988).
30. One House Budget Committee proposal would be a five-year phase-out of the LSC, which has
been allocated $415 million for fiscal year 1995. Claudia MacLachlan, Legal Services Comes Under
Attack-Again, NAT'L. L.J., Apr. 3, 1995, at A12.
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by means of an audit system much more extensive than that now available to
review how CJA funds are spent. The LSC has achieved the dual goal of
combining national funding and oversight with local control. The grantees of
the LSC are usually legal aid societies or similar organizations that have
representatives from the bar and the community to preserve their independence.
In the LSC, Congress has a successful working model for fashioning an
independent agency for federal defender services. Congress should not allow
deliberate judicial self-interest, as expressed by the Judicial Conference's
rejection of the Prado Committee's recommendation, to prevent it from
following the LSC model and giving defenders independence from the judiciary.
Some of the public defenders who opposed the Prado Committee recommendation have suggested that they must remain in the judiciary to preserve
their funding. However, the judiciary, as the weakest branch of Government,
has a difficult time securing funding for its own programs, and if its funds ever
need to be restricted, the federal defender step-child will be the last to be
considered and the first to be cut. The defenders need their own voice in
Congress, not a judicial echo unable to point out the present disparity between
gargantuan funding for the prosecution and inadequate funding for federal
criminal defense.31 When Congress creates new federal crimes, expands federal
criminal jurisdiction, or passes unfair minimum mandatory sentences, it should
be forced by an agency with expertise in the area to consider the impact on
federal defender services. Such expertise is not now available from a minuscule
part of the large judicial apparatus, which properly shirks the role of advocacy
in opposition to proposed legislation.
The annual appropriation for the Defense Services Corporation, which
would fund defense representation exclusively in federal criminal trials, should
be considered in conjunction with the budgets of the Department of Justice and
the judiciary. Fundamental fairness transcends political parties, and Congress
would see the corresponding need to provide the minimum funds for defense
when it considered the massive and disproportionate expenses for the
prosecution and federal investigative agencies. Senators and congressional
representatives take an oath to support the Constitution (including the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel), and it would be presumptuous to assume that
they would begrudge less to constitutionally required services than they allocate
now for non-mandated civil legal services.
Because of the opposition of the Judicial Conference and a majority of
federal public defenders, the Prado Committee's meritorious recommendation
of a separate organization for the delivery of defender services has little chance
of legislative success. At a minimum, however, Congress should direct that the
31. During the last two fiscal years, the initial CJA appropriation has been exhausted, and the
Administrative Office has had to temporarily curtail payment of vouchers for legal and other services.
The last-minute supplemental appropriations demonstrate that the judiciary, as the inappropriate
advocate for defense funding, has not been successful even in meeting the existing, limited requests for
financing.
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existing Defender Services Committee, which is the real policy body for
defender services, include at least defense counsel representatives.32 Several
critics have complained for years that this committee is not really equipped to
evaluate the critical defender issues without active voting participation of federal
criminal defense practitioners." The Prado Committee's suggestion for the
composition of the governing board of the proposed Center for Defender
Services should be applied to the composition of the Defender Services
Committee. If there is an inkling of giving defenders some independence within
the present judicial structure, judicial members should be eliminated from this
committee of the Judicial Conference.
IV
INDEPENDENCE AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

In structuring authority over federal defenders, Congress adopted the
essential principle of local control, but left it in the hands of the federal district
judges. Now the district court exercises almost unlimited control in choosing
whether to create a defender organization or utilize a panel of attorneys. The
district court determines the selection and compensation of the CJA panel
attorneys and authorizes and compensates investigators, experts, and others. 4
This pervasive control, both in fact and appearance, undermines zealous defense
advocacy.
If a federal public defender organization is created, the district court
recommends candidates for the position of director, and the court of appeals
appoints the federal public defender ("FPD") for a four-year term.3' The
power to appoint an FPD includes the power to fire one, and the court of
appeals has done this more than once based upon the initiative of the district
court. In some districts, FPDOs have been closed.
The court of appeals makes the formal selection of the FPD, but not without
the powerful input from the district court bench. In most cases, the district
court's recommendation is decisive in the selection of the candidate. In a few
cases, a dissonant court of appeals has appointed an FPD not to the liking of

32. Committees of the Judicial Conference need not be composed solely of federal judges.
Presently, for example, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and the Committee on
International Judicial Relations have members who are not judges. Memorandum from the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (Jan. 3, 1995) (on file with author).
33. Some present and past federal defenders have urged that the Defender Services Committee
include, as at least one-third of its representation, lawyers skilled and experienced in the delivery of
defender services. Obviously, prosecutors should not be included. Presently, one or more federal
defenders and an appointed counsel are permitted to meet with the all-judge Defender Services
Committee, but without the right to vote. This tokenism belies even a semblance of real participation
and reveals the greater need to provide a structural change to guarantee freedom from subservience
to the judiciary.
34. A district court may use its power to cut CJA vouchers for attorneys and to authorize and cut
them for investigators, experts, and other assistance to manifest its displeasure with "too much defense
advocacy." An ethical judge may not like the position of being the administrator for the defense team.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(2)(A) (1988).
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the district court, but in such cases the FPD has taken a beating in the selection
process.36 If the judges are able to so influence the selection process, the FPD
appears to be the lackey of the district court or the court of appeal, whichever
exercised the true power of appointment."
Chief Judge Wallace of the Ninth Circuit explained the obvious dilemma
that arises when judges are involved in the appointment of the FPD:
The judges who must evaluate whether to appoint a defender seeking a
subsequent term are the same judges who evaluate the defender and the
defender's staff's appellate arguments and performances.
It is the strong consensus of those circuit judges who have been serving on
the Ninth Circuit committee which administers these appointment procedures
that it is inappropriate for a Court of Appeals to exercise this responsibility.
These judges urge [the Prado] Committee to propose an alternative institution
to appoint and to remove federal public defenders. This sentiment coincides
with the recommendation of the Federal Courts Study Committee which
objected to the role of judges in the appointment and removal processes of
federal public defenders.38

Although these comments were made about the selection of FPDs in the Ninth
Circuit, other courts of appeal have been less independent in the exercise of the
power to appoint and often defer to the recommendation of the district court.39
If an FPD is subject to such judicial control, his ability both in fact and in
appearance to represent zealously the criminally accused is compromised.
Under existing law, the alternative to the FPDO is the Community Defender
Organization (the "CDO"). ° CDOs are less numerous than FPDOs, but are
present in several major federal criminal jurisdictions within the United States:
New York City, Chicago, Detroit,41 San Diego, and Atlanta. The CDO can be
a separate organization or a part of a preexisting defender services organization.42 The CDO is a local nonprofit corporation governed by a board of

36. The Ninth Circuit several times has appointed FPDs who, because they were not welcomed by
the district courts, became "aliens" in the districts. Since the district courts originally had the practical
power of appointment of the FPD, they now do not readily submit to newly asserted direction of the
courts of appeals.
37. When the district judges select a magistrate judge, there is a more formal procedure to ensure
merit selection than the statutory system for the selection of an FPD director. See 28 U.S.C. § 631
(1988 & Supp. V 1994). It may be appropriate for judges to select judges, but it is not appropriate for
judges to select advocates who regularly appear before them to challenge the government.
38. CoMMrrEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2287.
39. In the past, the Ninth Circuit appointed all federal public defenders on the recommendation
of the district court. However, that circuit has recently begun appointing FPDs not favored by the
district court. Other courts of appeals usually give great deference to the district court, and even if
several candidates are submitted by the district court, that court's preference among the candidates will
be given great weight.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(2) (1988).
41. In September 1994, Paul Borman, the director of the Legal Aid and Defender Association of
Detroit, a CDO, became the first federal defender appointed to the federal bench. His appointment
constitutes a major breakthrough toward the ultimate goal of treating the federal defender in a similar
fashion to his professional counterpart, the U.S. Attorney. The U.S. Attorney position is often a
stepping-stone to the federal bench.
42. The CDOs in New York City are branches of the long-established Legal Aid Society, which also
provides defender services in the state court.
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directors, which selects the director of the defender office. The CDO receives
an annual grant much as an FPD receives an authorized budget. The bar is
actively involved in these organizations, which ensures their professional
independence and that they are representative of the community. The value of
a board of directors as a link to the community, not just to the bar, and as a
buffer from both the prosecutor and bench, cannot be overestimated.
The Prado Committee suggested that the FPDO have a local advisory board
that would operate as this link and buffer.43 The local board could also serve
as an ongoing performance evaluator of the defender when it comes time for
reappointment. The local board would alleviate the concerns about judicial
control of the defender function. For the FPD, who has operated without such
a board, the board may be considered a nuisance. For the director of the CDO,
the board is an excellent in-house sounding board for free advice and assistance
not now available to the FPD. Despite these advantages, the Judicial
Conference rejected the Prado Committee's suggestion.
V
OTHER NEEDED REFORMS

A. Term Limits and Turnover for Federal Defenders
The courts of appeals are now grappling with the difficulties in selecting an
FPD after an incumbent has served a term of four years. Should the selection
process be open to all applicants, or should the incumbent be given preference?
The appointment process for an FPD, like that for any politician, is critical, and
those who exercise the power of appointment have a powerful influence on that
office holder. Presently, the district courts still exercise strong if not controlling
influence on the replacement of the FPD. A truly impartial judge who must
rule on the advocacy of the FPD on behalf of unpopular clients should not want
control over the livelihood of the advocate. Such control diminishes the stature
of the judge and of the FPD.4
A recommendation made to the Prado Committee, but not adopted, was to
impose a term limit of ten years on the director of an FPD or CDO. The
principles of democracy and history teach us the need to limit the tenure of
public officials. After a four-term presidency, a constitutional amendment was
passed to limit that office to two terms.45 After the inability of several
presidents to remove the entrenched director of the FBI, Congress limited the
term of that office to ten years. 46 The ten-year term balances the need for
experience and a guarantee of some tenure against the danger of institutional-

43.
44.
office.
45.
46.

COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2301-02.
Recently, a 12-year FPD applied for a fourth term, but was rejected and will now leave that
U.S. CONST. amend. XXII.
Crime Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-503, tit. II, § 203, 90 Stat. 2407, 2427.
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ization.47 The director of an FPD or CDO with a ten-year term can plan for
his or her successor. Orderly change in leadership is healthy.' s Perhaps the
FPD might choose to remain with the office if financial security were a
consideration, but an effective advocate should be able to survive in legal
practice outside the embryonic support of mother government.
The concept of turnover should also be applied to the staff of the office.
Like a law firm, the defender office should have some suitable pruning system
that allows both for the turnover of associates and the recruitment of partners
to create the stable core element of experience essential for a federal defender
office. The majority of federal defender offices recruit only from the ranks of
experienced lawyers, but every defender office should have entry-level positions
for recent law graduates. The influx of young lawyers adds an energetic and
questioning approach that complements the work of the experienced staff. To
use recent law graduates, the defender office must have a strong internal
training program and a commitment from the graduates to make sacrifices to
earn the necessary experience.4 9
B. Continuity of Representation on Appeal
The CJA expressly requires that trial counsel continue on appeal.'
However, because trials provide experience in addition to some compensation,
many attorneys prefer them to the dry review of appeals. There are those who
would accept trial appointments, but are not willing to continue on appeal. The
statutory presumption in favor of continuity provides better and more efficient
representation. A good trial lawyer will be aware of the legal requirements for
preserving a good appeal and will be able to create an effective record for the
appellate court.51 Those attorneys who believe their role is limited to the trial
47. The 10-year limitation should apply equally to both FPDs and CDO directors. While the FPD
has a four-year term, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(2)(A) (1988), the director of a CDO serves at the will of
the board. COMMrITEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 2274. The 10-year limitation would stimulate the
preparation of a capable successor from within the office as well as give adequate notice for a search
from without.
48. The proposed 10-year limit should apply only prospectively from the date of its imposition,
because several FPDs have earned stature in their legal community that has counterbalanced the
influence of the court. The 10-year limit should be implemented to achieve, not defeat, the
independence of an incumbent FPD or director of a CDO.
49. The San Diego and Spokane CDOs require all attorneys to agree in writing to a minimum 60hour work week to address the needs of the clientele and to participate in weekly evening and Saturday
training sessions. During their minimum two-year service, young associates gain from the experience
and training and at the same time return the benefits of this training to the clients.
50. "A person for whom counsel is appointed shall be represented at every stage of the proceedings
from his initial appearance before the United States Magistrate or the court through appeal, including
ancillary matters appropriate to the proceedings." 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c) (1988). The court also has the
right to substitute appointed counsel at any stage.
51. In former times, the trial lawyer focused principally on facts presented to a jury, and the
appellate lawyer was the brief writer, knowledgeable of then-limited federal criminal law and procedure.
Today, the complexity of federal law, which permeates every stage of the trial and sentencing, requires
that every defense attorney be responsible for asserting and preserving every viable legal issue for later
review. The trial defense lawyer must have a comprehensive knowledge of this growing specialty to
preserve legal issues for review properly.
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might not be so diligent in preserving not only the legal error but the context
that makes it prejudicial. Additionally, if lawyers who try cases are not the ones
writing the appeals, then another lawyer must become familiar with the client
and the case. Legal issues are not evaluated in the abstract, but in how they
impact the presentation of the defense, and this needs to be articulated for the
appellate court. 2 An appellate panel of attorneys without substantial trial
experience cheats both the client and the court. Therefore, attorneys who will
not follow through on the appeal, an obligation owed primarily to the client,
should not be on the trial panel. An exception may exist where there is a
volume of cases in a defender office that might justify appellate specialization,
but this justification would require close coordination between the trial and
appellate sections to avoid duplication of effort.53
If a question about the competency of the trial attorney is raised, of course,
other counsel should be appointed. However, in light of the paucity of cases
that get reversed for ineffective assistance of counsel, this should not be an
open-ended excuse for trial counsel to be relieved of taking the appeal. Unless
the trial attorney's performance is legitimately questioned, the duplication of
appellate counsel when CJA funds are limited cannot be justified.
C. Training for Defense Attorneys
In 1986, the CJA was specifically amended to authorize training for
attorneys appointed under the Act.54 Prior to that time, each office conducted
its own training, but in December 1983, a one-week training program for new
attorney staff of federal defender offices was initiated at the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center at Glynco, Georgia. This orientation program,
which is generally still available to new attorneys, has now been supplemented
with a two-week practical skills course at the National College of Criminal
Defense at Mercer School of Law in Macon, Georgia, when space has been
made available.
This limited training for new attorneys is grossly inadequate for those who
are required to become immediate specialists in federal criminal law, with its
complex and draconian sentencing guideline scheme. Even an experienced state
criminal law practitioner needs orientation as to the intricacies of federal
criminal law and practice. The Army offers a ten-week basic skills course to its
new judge advocate officers (military lawyers) at the U.S. Army Judge Advocate

52. Sentencing issues are now as important as pretrial or trial issues. If the trial lawyer has not
properly developed the sentencing issue or has failed to object, the issue will not be reviewed by the
appellate court. United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir. 1992) (no review
except for plain error); United States v. Livingston, 936 F.2d 333, 335 (7th Cir. 1991).
53. In the widespread military justice system, the military attorneys who handle the appeals are not
necessarily the same as those who defend the accused at trial. E.g., U.S.A.F Instruction 51-201, ch. 11
(1994). However, special circumstances justify this bifurcation.
54. The Criminal Justice Act Revision of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-651, § 102(a)(6), 100 Stat. 3642, 3645
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(i) (1988)), inserted a provision for funding continuing
education and training of persons providing representational services under the CJA.
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General's School in Charlottesville, Virginia.5 The Army wisely invests in its
new lawyers, who will be using a criminal justice system that is in many ways
copied from the federal system. The same skills course should be provided for
all those who serve full-time in an FPDO or CDO.
Each defender office should have its own in-house initial and continuing
training program. Entry-level, advanced, and specialized programs should be
conducted on a national level. Attorneys, as well as investigators and other
staff, should be able to devote their full time to this intensive training. Each
defender office, no matter how small, must have the capability of conducting
training for the panel attorneys. In the efficient use of federal funding, the
federal defenders could probably arrange to use the excellent Army training
facility and gain much from the military's experience in preparing lawyers for
a new specialty.
In 1993, the Administrative Office initiated a national training program for
appointed panel attorneys. It was named "Only the Strong Survive," because
those who practice federal criminal defense are aware of the beating defense
counsel take on the not-so-level playing fields of the federal courts. These
regional training programs were again conducted last year, but because two
attorneys were removed from future training programs for making improper
remarks56 found offensive to the judiciary, the federal defender directing the
programs resigned, and almost all of the National Association of Criminal
Defense instructors withdrew. The reasons for the removal of the two attorneys
are not at issue, but the control by the judiciary is.
D. Limited Right of Client to Select Counsel
A defendant charged with child molestation in state court complained that
his public defender could not present a defense and referred to the attorney as
a "dump truck." At a jury trial-over the protestation of the defendant that he
was receiving ineffective assistance of counsel-the defense lawyer did not voir
dire the jury, made no objection during the prosecution's presentation of the
case, made no opening statement, cross-examined no prosecution witness,
presented no evidence on behalf of the defendant, and waived closing argument
to the jury. The California Court of Appeal, finding no prejudice, affirmed the
conviction57 and characterized the actions of trial defense counsel as a "stealth
defense.,

55. The Air Force has a similar program at its Judge Advocate General's School in Maxwell,
Alabama.
56. One used a four-letter word, and the author used the phrase "Sieg Hel," German for "hail
victory." Some federal defenders use the term to satirize what they perceive as a judicial mind-set that
the government must always win.
57. People v. Huffman, 139 Cal. Rptr. 264 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). The appellate court, demonstrating
its protective instincts for the institutional defender, commented that retained counsel were often not
equal to the public defender. Id. at 267 n.2.
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Reviewing courts are extremely reluctant to reverse criminal convictions
because of the alleged substandard performance of defense counsel.5" The
result is that a defendant may be forced to trial with an attorney whom he or
she believes is a "dump truck," but has no recourse on appeal. This hardly
breeds confidence in the judicial system.
One of the recommendations of the Prado Committee that was adopted by
the Judicial Conference and forwarded to Congress called for the creation of
volunteer pilot programs in the districts to give certain CJA-eligible defendants
a limited choice of counsel.59 This limited choice of counsel imparts to the
defendants a sense of responsibility for their own fate. Also, the availability of
a choice stimulates a desire to be wanted on the part of the attorneys in the
pool of potential counsel. This recommendation will help provide feedback
from the clients, which must be built into the system.
In the San Diego CDO, any client who was not satisfied with the services of
a particular staff attorney was interviewed by the head of the office. If the
client had serious problems in relating to the initially designated attorney, he or
she was offered the choice of any available attorney in the office. When
afforded the power to choose, the client often would continue with the same
attorney. If the client was critical of the defender office as a whole, then the
CDO recommended the appointment of a panel attorney, which was usually
granted by the court. The client did not get to select a particular attorney, but
had the ability to avoid an attorney who was perceived as inexperienced or
uninterested. This procedure provided important feedback on the performance
of the staff attorneys. Likewise, a client represented by a panel attorney could
be given a choice of another panel attorney or a staff attorney of the FPDO or
CDO, if one existed in the district.'
The right to choose counsel emphasizes that the attorney works for the client
and not for the "system": not for the court that makes the appointment and
reviews the vouchers, and not for the government that pays for these services.
VI
CONCLUSION

The recent federal crime control legislation, the product of the biennial
congressional effort to capitalize on the crime issue, expands federal criminal
jurisdiction, greatly increases the number of offenses punishable by death or

58. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (holding that, absent clearly prejudicial
circumstances such as those found in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), even if inexperienced
attorney performance is deficient, specific prejudice must be established before relief is granted).
Cronic and other cases have established a form of judicial review that seldom finds prejudice; attorney
performance is therefore rarely reviewed.
59. REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE FEDERAL DEFENDER
PROGRAM

34 (1993).

60. The client could be given a list of five panel attorneys. The opportunity to select other counsel
should occur early in the process and must take into consideration the problem of conflict of interest.
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long-term confinement (that is, "three strikes"), and geometrically increases the
litigation of criminal cases. Such laws create the concomitant need for more
qualified counsel for the accused. Those who are to be processed by the
increasingly harsh federal system now more than ever need truly independent
and zealous advocacy to obtain justice from an apparatus blinded by the
perceived need for punishment. Adoption of the recommendation of the Prado
Committee to restructure defender services would ensure their independence.
The Judicial Conference's rejection and subversion of this minimal recommendation elevates the subservient partnership of the federal defender and the
judicial bureaucracy over the essential loyalty owed to the client.

